Property rights are commonly touted as a solution to common pool resource problems. In practice, however, the security of property rights over natural resources varies substantially, which may aect returns to ownership as well as asset values. We examine theoretically the capitalized asset market eects of weakened property rights to natural resources. We then assemble a unique dataset of global sheries to examine empirically how dierences in property right strength aect market outcomes. Consistent with our theoretical predictions we nd signicant asset market capitalization of insecurity arising from: (1) ownership disputes, (2) illegal extraction from resource stocks, and (3) the possibility of government revocation of rights. Overall, these results suggest important pecuniary eects of weakened property rights to natural resources. *
Capitalizing property rights insecurity in natural resource assets
To overcome the problems associated with common pool resources (e.g. Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968) , property rights approaches to management are increasingly employed globally. Across resources, strong evidence of increased economic and ecological performance from rights-based approaches has emerged (Grafton et al., 2000; Costello et al., 2008) , and the policy debate has shifted away from the eectiveness of these approaches toward questions of design. While it seems self-evident that design elements may aect the security of a property right, this link has not been adequately explored. For example, so-called "sunset clauses" after which rights are revoked and redistributed will aect stewardship and value (Costello and Kane, 2008 ) and assignment of rights to only a portion of the resource stock may erode conservation and investment incentives (Deacon et al., 2012) . Other fundamental design parameters include limits on ownership or transferability (Grafton et al., 2000) , revocability, and geographic or temporal control over resource stocks. Despite their ubiquity and importance for design, to our knowledge the extent to which these limitations on property rights security aect behavior and economic value has not been carefully studied. The purpose of this paper is to develop and analyze a model linking insecure property rights to asset markets, and to employ that model to empirically examine these eects for a globally signicant common pool resource.
Our empirical application concerns the movement to property rights for global sheries, but this story is not unique to sheries. The deleterious consequences of common pool management of resources such as timber, air, water, and biodiversity are increasingly realized.
These declines have lead to the establishment of property rights over these resources. In so doing, governments inevitably wrestle with equity-eciency tradeos in determining how much control to cede to private resource owners, where more control typically confers a stronger property right to its owner. Loosely speaking, when the government retains more control over the resource, it weakens the property rights held by individuals; this may or may not be transmitted through market prices for the natural resource asset. We explore three general classes of property right insecurity that are chosen to capture a large set of the real-world circumstances under which property rights are weakened. The rst concerns uncertainty over future ownership and is modeled as an ownership dispute that will be resolved once-and-for-all at a known date in the future, the second involves illegal harvest activity, and the third examines the eects of a perpetual threat that the property right will be revoked. Table provides several real-world examples of natural resources managed by property rights that are subject to one or more of these sources of asset insecurity.
While the structure of property rights surely diers across natural resources, a common model is the so-called "cap and trade" model where the level of extraction from resource stocks is set by a regulator, extraction rights are owned by individual rms, and those rms divide, buy, sell, and lease those rights as assets. These "quota markets" oer an ideal opportunity to study the eects of property right security on asset values because the relationship between lease price and sales price of asset will be dictated by market fundamentals. For example, among the examples given in Table , some sheries managed by tradable quota are prone to illegal harvest or whose underlying property rights are legally revocable.
The details of quota markets and property right security for natural resources are well showed large gains. In a follow-up paper, Newell et al (2007) extend this analysis to a more formal model of asset pricing for "created markets". They nd that asset prices are higher when interest rates are lower, and asset values are lower for stocks with higher biological uctuation. They also nd that stocks that had large decreases in costs or high growth rates in output prices have higher quota asset prices. These papers contribute signicantly to our understanding of quota markets and asset pricing, though they do not address the issue of property rights security or institutional design.
We begin by developing an analytical model of a natural resource managed with property rights. Harvest rights are owned and can be divided, bought, sold, and leased among a competitive set of resource users. We consider three general ways that institutional design may aect the security of property rights over natural resources: disputes over ownership, instances where extraction may be (partially) uncontrolled by the regulator, and cases where the right may be revoked entirely. We use the model to generate predictions about the impact of property rights design on asset values and lease prices. Because many forms of property right insecurity involve uncertainty over future rent capture, we follow the literature on asset pricing and use the dividend price ratio to capture future expectations. This measure accomplishes two goals. First, it measures the market's capitalized belief's about the future returns on the asset (this is the denominator or "price"). Second, it controls for a whole suite of potentially unobservable resource-specic characteristics by incorporating the current period return on the asset (via the numerator, or "dividend"). While this is an attractive measure, the extent to which it can be relied upon to reect changes in property rights security for natural resources has not been carefully studied. For example, some changes in property rights may aect both the current returns (the dividend) and future expectations (the price) which may dampen, or even cancel out completely, any measurable eect on the dividend price ratio. We derive a number of concrete theoretical predictions that directly link capitalized asset values and dividend price ratios to property right insecurity.
We use these theoretical insights to examine the eects of property right insecurity on global sheries asset values. To do so, we exploit dierences in property rights within and across countries to determine the market implications of secure ownership of these assets.
We nd that property rights security has a signicant eect on asset values in sheries. In accordance with theoretical predictions, markets appear to be capitalizing ownership disputes (in our application market participants behave as if there is a 45% chance of rights being modied), illegal harvest (where market outcomes suggest that the problem is worsening over time), and the possibility of revocation of the right (where markets behave as if this eect is more signicant than the discount rate itself). Overall, our results suggest that the security of property rights has a profound impact on economic outcomes in (previously) common pool resources.
Theoretical Background
We begin by developing a simple analytical model to examine the role of property rights on lease and sales prices of a natural resource asset. 1 We begin by assuming that a natural resource asset is owned, divisible, leasable, and transferable in a market. We denote by π t the competitive market rental rate (equivalently, lease price) of the asset. If rights are secure and held in perpetuity, the sales price of the asset will capitalize the expected discounted 1 A famous application of this type of reasoning outside of natural resources is in Fogel and Engerman (1974) , who examine slave price trends leading up to the end of the Civil War. rent stream as follows:
where δ is the discount factor. Dividing the period-0 rental rate by the capitalized asset value gives
This ratio is commonly used in nance to test future expectations about earnings, to compare measures of asset value across geographically distinct markets, and to test for bubbles in asset markets (see, e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1988; and Cochrane, 1991; Poterba, 1991) . In that literature, it is referred to as the dividend price ratio, to which we will conform here.
Modifying this simple model can yield sharp analytical predictions about the eects of property rights security on dividend price ratios. Property right insecurity over natural resource assets can occur for numerous reasons. We focus on: (1) Ownership disputes, where some fraction of the asset may be transferred to another owner without compensation, (2) Illegal harvest, where the owner captures only a fraction of the resource's rent, and (3) Possible revocation, where the government or other party poses a credible and perpetual threat to revoke all rights to the asset. Ultimately, theoretical analysis of each issue will result in a prediction that is empirically testable.
Ownership disputes
We rst analyze the eect of an ownership dispute on the ex-ante and ex-post dividend price ratio. We model the ownership dispute as follows: The initial asset owner holds a secure right to access the resource in the current period (so π 0 is not aected by the dispute), but the ownership is under dispute so future ownership is uncertain. In water rights, for example, this may take the form of a dispute over agricultural vs. in-stream ows that will be resolved by court decision on a particular day. We assume that the dispute will be resolved prior to period 1. We further assume that the policy function being pursued (which need not be the result of a dynamic optimization) is independent of the resolution of asset ownership. 2 In the absence of an ownership dispute, the dividend price ratio is given by Equation 2. 2 The policy function determines the time paths of extraction and resource stock levels. Now suppose that some fraction (1 − α) of the asset is under dispute that will be resolved once-and-for-all prior to period 1. With probability p the dispute will disadvantage the asset owner, so the right will be modied. With probability 1 − p the dispute is settled in the owner's favor so the right remains unaltered. Under this setup, the expected present value of the asset prior to dispute resolution is:
where V τ is as dened in equation 1. The dividend price ratio prior to the dispute resolution is:
This ratio clearly depends, for example, on the proportion of the asset under dispute (1 − α)
and on the probability of alteration of the right (p). However, once period 1 arrives, the uncertainty over the dispute will have been resolved. This gives rise to the following result:
Result 1. Following the dispute resolution, the dividend price ratio is given by:
regardless of the outcome of the dispute. If the resource is in steady state, R 1 < R 0 .
The rst clause of Result 1 follows directly from the identity: V 1 ≡ π 1 +δV 2 , and says that, while the dividend price ratio will change following dispute resolution, it will always change to the same level, regardless of the outcome of the dispute. The second clause states that if the resource is in steady state (so π t = π t+1 ∀t), then the sign of the change is also independent of the outcome: resolving the dispute will always decrease the dividend price ratio. 3 Result 1 presents an empirically relevant nding: suppose we observe the dividend price ratio before and after a dispute is resolved. Result 1 says that the sign of the change reveals nothing about how the dispute is capitalized into asset values. However, the magnitude of the change in dividend price ratio does reveal important information. It will become useful to dene the expected fraction of the asset that is revoked as β ≡ p − αp. Employing the set of equations above, and assuming steady state, we can immediately calculate the decrease in the dividend price ratio following the dispute resolution, as follows:
We can rearrange this expression to back-out the implied property right insecurity preceding the dispute resolution, as follows:
Result 2. The market's expectation of the fraction of the asset that will be revoked is given by:
. Result 2 implies that we can use the change in dividend price ratio -before vs. after the dispute resolution -to estimate the ex-ante market capitalization of the dispute. In our empirical application we will make use of Result 2 by observing the change in the dividend price ratio (∆R) surrounding a legal dispute, and calculating the implied expectation of asset alteration, β.
1.2
Illegal or uncontrolled extraction
A second important class of property rights insecurity involves illegal or uncontrolled exploitation of the natural resource. A common example from forestry concerns private landholders in developing countries who manage their lands under a perpetual barrage of illegal timber extraction. Harvest outside of the owner's control obviously weakens the ability of the owner to capture resource rents, and consequently would be expected to lower the value of the asset. On the other hand, illegal harvest would also presumably reduce the dividend (i.e. rental rate) to the righful owner of the resource. Thus, care is required to develop testable hypotheses about the eects of illegal extraction on the dividend price ratio.
We begin by assuming that both the illegal and managed extraction levels are in steady state -they remain constant over time, 4 though we allow the level of extraction would clearly depend on the amount of illegal activity taking place. Letπ(f ) be the steady state dividend to the asset owner where f measures the level of illegal harvest taking place and dπ/df < 0. The dividend price ratio with illegal harvest is denotedR(f ). The following result is straightforward but instructive:
Result 3. Provided the system is in steady state, the dividend price ratio is independent of the level of illegal harvest, and is given by:R(f) = 1 − δ.
Provided rental rates are in steady state, the level of illegal harvest has no eect on the dividend price ratio because both the dividend and the price are equivalently aected; the market eect of illegal harvest is exactly cancelled out.
However, in the presence of illegal activity it is possible that the system is out of steady state; illegal harvest might be increasing or decreasing over time. To proceed, we need not a assume a functional form describing how illegal harvest changes over time, but we do assume that, over time, it has a monotonic eect on rental rates. Here, we denote the period t asset value byV t , the rental rate byπ t , and the rental rate change by: ∆π t ≡π t+1 −π t . As stated above, we will assume that ∆π t is either: (1) > 0 ∀t, (2)< 0 ∀t, or (3) = 0 ∀t. Letting the change in asset value be ∆V t , we will make use of the following lemma:
For example, if illegal harvest is increasing, so the rental rate is decreasing over time (∆π t < 0), then Lemma 1 says that the asset price is also decreasing over time (∆V t < 0). This is intuitive since the asset value is nothing more than the discounted sum of future rental rates.
Ultimately we are interested in whether illegal harvest will have any predictable eect on the dividend price ratio. Result 3 shows that if the system is in steady state (∆π t = 0) then the dividend price ratio is independent of the level of illegal extraction. The following result shows how this conclusion is generalized when the system is out of steady state:
Result 4. The presence of illegal harvest has the following eects on the dividend price ratio:
Result 4 presents a testable hypothesis. Consider two resource assets that are otherwise identical, but where asset A is plagued by illegal harvest while asset B is not (so f is larger for A than for B). If the dividend price ratio for A exceeds that for B (R A >R B ) then we can conclude that the economic consequences of illegal extraction are getting worse over time. IfR A <R B the we can conclude that the illegal activity is abating over time. And if R A =R B , then the market perceives no future changes in the amount of illegal activity. In our dataset, we will control for other factors and will estimate the eect of the "presence of illegal activity", noted in management reports, on dividend price ratios. We will then make use of Result 4 to interpret the implied expectation about its future eects.
Revocation possibility
Finally, we consider the case where the property right itself is perpetually in jeopardy. We assume that the asset owner faces a xed annual probability (θ) of losing the right. This could reect, for example, a government who wishes to preserve the right to change institutional design which may involve revoking the right from the current owner. Alternatively, governments may reallocate land to squatters, as in the case of Brazil (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 2000) . This class of property right insecurity is common, particularly in developing countries that face high government turnover. We allow for the system to be out of steady state and develop a Bellman equation formulation. The policy function need not be optimized, though we assume it is independent of θ. Conditional on owning the asset in period
has not yet been revoked), the expected asset value in period τ is given by:
Rewriting and solving for the period-0 asset value gives:
which leads to the following period-0 dividend price ratio:
Here, revocation risk enters as an additional discounting term in a manner similar to risk premia in asset markets (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) . This gives rise to our next result:
Result 5. Regardless of whether the system is optimized or in steady state, but provided that the policy function is independent of θ, the dividend price ratio is increasing in the annual revocation probability, θ.
Dierentiating Equation 9
with respect to θ gives: dR 0 /dθ = δṼ 1 /Ṽ 0 which is always positive, is increasing in δ and in the ratioṼ 1 /Ṽ 0 . Result 5 suggests that we can use the dividend price ratio to test the market response to dierences in revocation probabilities:
Consider two assets A and B that are otherwise identical, but which may face dierent revocation probabilities. It is straightforward to show (by manipulating Equation 9) that the dierence in revocation probabilities is proportional to the dierence in dividend price ratios. That is, we can back out the market's implied dierence in revocation probability by simply knowing the dierence in dividend price ratios, as follows:
Result 6. The dierence in revocation probability between two otherwise identical assets is given by:
where Y ≡Ṽ
We will make empirical use of this result by controlling for other relevant factors and comparing the dividend price ratios in countries with dierent legal mandates to preserve the right to revoke the asset.
Armed with these theoretical insights, the remainder of the paper presents an empirical application to global sheries assets, where property rights are increasingly used to overcome the negative consequences of open access. Using a mix of within-country analysis (to examine the eects of ownership disputes and illegal shing) and cross-country analysis (to isolate the eects of revocation possibility), we are able to examine empirically each of the results developed above.
Global Fisheries Assets
In sheries, where the common pool feature has led to broad-scale sheries (e.g. limited entry, where the number of vessels is restricted, and often an overall quota is set for 5 The equality holds by the assumption of the assets being "otherwise identical". all licensed shermen. Under such management, resource rents may still be dissipated in the race to sh and overcapitalization (Homans and Wilen, 1997) . In an attempt to allow the capture of resource rents, many sheries have adopted catch shares or other rights-based management.
In this paper, we focus our empirical analysis exclusively on sheries managed by tradable quota shares. Individual Transferable Quota (ITQs), a form of catch shares, are the most prevalent form of shery property right in the industrialized world, where the holder of an ITQ owns an asset which confers the right to harvest a share of the total allowable catch in the present year and into the future. ITQs have been hailed by economists as a means to capture the rents in sheries. But in practice, the design of ITQ systems varies signicantly across sheries; these design idiosyncracies may aect property rights security, and as analyzed above, the resulting insecurity may be transmitted through asset values, lease prices, or a combination (dividend price ratios). We will utilize our model to interpret empirical ndings regarding this link.
Under ITQ management, shares of the total allowable catch (TAC) are allocated to individuals (or rms or cooperatives), who then hold the right to harvest their share each year. Typically, the holder of an ITQ can exercise that harvest right, lease it to another sherman, or sell it. This has been shown to help achieve allocative and technical eciency (Grafton et al, 2000) , which adds signicant value in a shery. In addition to eliminating the "race for sh," ITQ management has been shown to reverse the collapse of sheries (Costello et al, 2008 There is also important variation in the security of property rights within countries.
Beyond dierences in design features, some stocks are prone to signicant illegal harvest due to high enforcement costs, while highly migratory species are subject to harvest by neighboring jurisdictions or in international waters. Ownership of quota shares in these stocks is arguably less secure than stocks with good enforcement and/or species that stay within the waters of the managing jurisdiction. And in some cases the ownership of the asset itself may be disputed, as is the case in New Zealand where the native Maori challenged the allocation of shing assets to non-Maori.
Regulators in every country impose idiosyncratic limitations on trades, duration, and use of ITQ shares, including (but not limited to) caps on ownership of shares, restrictions on ownership by foreign eets, vessel capacity or gear restrictions, and sunset provisions. 6 In the empirical analysis we control for shery-and country-specic characteristics and estimate the eects of various sources of insecurity on asset market outcomes. the same in these countries, the governments have very dierent laws underlying the quota share held by individuals; these imply palpable dierences in property rights security on which we will focus here. 7 
ITQs as Property Rights
In the United States, the resources in a marine shery are deemed "common property," and are held in trust by the government for the community at large. Such resources cannot be transferred to or owned by individuals. The Magnuson-Stevens Act 8 holds that quota shares "shall be considered a permit;" "may be revoked, limited, or modied at any time;" "shall not confer any right of compensation to the holder...if it is revoked, limited, or modied;"
and "shall not create, or be construed to create, any right, title, or interest in or to any sh before the sh is harvested by the holder."
As a result of this insecure property right, there is uncertainty about the future of the program, and holders of quota shares are generally unable to use their holdings as collateral at banks. 9 As anecdotal evidence, when asked why this is the case, a sherman in the Red
Snapper shery in the Gulf of Mexico stated that "we don't really own anything. In the legal language, it's a privilege. There's always a danger that the government can change its shery policy down the road, and then the quota would be worthless." 10 Another expressed his concern that the ITQ management would disappear after the ve-year review.
A In New Zealand, property rights are explicitly established in the creation of ITQs, and over the past 25 years nearly all commercial sheries have shifted to ITQ management. The right to a share of the catch is held in perpetuity, and when a program is discontinued, or where the allocation is changed by the regulator, shers are entitled to nancial compensation. Indeed, in the initial allocation of quota under the QMS, allocations were in terms of tonnes, and the TAC was xed. When shery managers subsequently decided to lower the TAC, quota were bought back in an expensive scheme. 12 Tables of the sheries included in this analysis are provided in the appendix for North America (Table 4 ) and New Zealand (Table 5) . 
Within-Country Analysis
We begin by testing the predictions from our model using data from New Zealand. Because ITQ programs are generally subject to federal laws dening catch shares, most within-country Newell et al (2005), we calculate greenweight tonnage prices using export price data for each year, and conversion factors from Clement and Associates. 15 In consultation with FishServe, a small number of observations are omitted from the analysis because they are believed to contain signicant errors. Including these observations does not qualitatively change our results. 16 At this time, data from the Alaskan Crab shery are not available. Furthermore, we are unaware of any historical data on quota prices in the Atlantic Surf Clam / Ocean Quahog shery.
features of property rights are similar across sheries. 17 However, because of its rich and diverse set of sheries managed with property rights, New Zealand is an ideal place to exploit several sources of within-country heterogeneity. We begin by analyzing a dispute between incumbent asset holders and the Maori people of New Zealand to examine the exante market consequences of an ownership dispute on asset values. We then exploit variation in the exclusivity of the property right across sheries in New Zealand resulting from illegal harvest and highly migratory behavior of several sh stocks.
Ownership Disputes and the Treaty of Waitangi
Two important policy changes in New Zealand between 1989 and 1992 may plausibly have impacted beliefs about ITQ security within New Zealand. In 1986, the initial allocations in the QMS system were in terms of tonnes, rather than as a percentage of the annual total allowable catch. Subsequent analysis by the Ministry of Fisheries revealed that some allocations were too generous and would need to be reduced based on the available shstock.
This possible policy change (which was later ratied) was interpreted by shery asset holders as a dispute that may aect ownership. Indeed, the Ministry of Fisheries proceeded to redene the right as a percentage of the total allowable catch, rather than a nominal right. 18 After much debate, the government honored the property rights by issuing a buyback of quota where the initial allocation was too high. The buybacks began in 1989 and were nalized over the next two years.
Around the same time, there was a debate about how the Maori people, native New Zealanders, were being treated under the QMS system. The Maori people had traditionally relied on the ocean's resources, and there was a concern that the quota system did not take into account the signicance of the sheries to them. A legal dispute ensued, citing the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840. If resolved in the Maori's favor, some fraction of the shery assets would be redistributed to tribes. In the end, the Maori people were allocated 20% of the TAC for some key stocks. Results 1-2 will be used to interpret the market outcome of these disputes.
Our model predicts an immediate drop in the dividend price ratio (R) of ITQ assets upon the resolution of the ownership disputes. As described above, the Treaty of Waitangi serves as an interesting natural experiment. As an initial exploration, we present local linear regression plots in Figure 1 (for ownership disputes) . Figure 1 shows local linear regression estimates for alternative bandwidths for the dividend price ratio,R, in New Zealand sheries over time. Estimates suggest thatR decreased markedly (approximately 3.5 percentage points) upon resolution of the disputes in 1992. We will subsequently expand this analysis to a more formal regression model to help control for other variables that may plausibly aect the dividend price ratio. 
Illegal and Uncontrolled Harvest of New Zealand Fish Stocks
While property rights characteristics such as disposition, use, and possession do not vary signicantly across New Zealand sheries, there is substantial variation in exclusivity. This variation is not policy-induced, but rather is a function of the characteristics of the species.
While some species do not move signicantly across space, several "highly migratory" species move in and out of New Zealand waters, where they are subject to shing pressure outside New Zealand's exclusive economic zone.
But even for local stocks, there is some evidence of illegal harvest. For each commercial species in the Quota Management System in New Zealand, the 2008 Plenary Report from the Ministry of Fisheries discusses any known evidence of illegal harvests. Of the 75 species with sucient data for the analysis here, there are six instances where signicant illegal takes are believed to occur due to high monitoring costs. Thus, for each stock in New Zealand we are able to identify those that are highly migratory and those that suer from illegal take (or both). 19 These will be modeled as dummy variables in the regression analysis and results will be interpreted using our theoretical Results 3-4.
Our model predicts that asset values would be lower in sheries that migrate out of New In order to test the predictions from our analytical model, we need to estimate econometric models with two alternative outcome variables: 1) the asset value of an ITQ and 2) the ITQ The main outcome variable for our within-New Zealand analysis is the quota's dividend price ratio, given by the annual lease price of quota for a shstock and year divided by its sales price. We are able to control for a host of factors, including 5-year Treasury yields, trends for catch and greenweight prices, 21 time to maturity, length at maturity, maximum age, shery type (inshore, oshore, or shellsh) 22 and whether or not the Ministry characterizes a species as recreationally or customarily "signicant." In addition, we control for stockspecic revenue volatility, which captures both inter-annual uctuations in total harvest and product prices. In some specications (columns 2 and 5) we include year xed eects instead of the interest rate to control for unobserved contemporaneous shocks.
Within-New Zealand Results
As described above, using within-country variation we can test two general predictions regarding asset prices and dividend price ratios from our analytical model: the impact of the resolution of the ownership dispute regarding the Treaty of Waitangi, and the impact of uncontrolled harvest. The econometric results within New Zealand are shown in Table 2 .
Columns (1)- (3) show the results for the specications with the asset value as the dependent variable (instrumenting for the lease price with the greenweight value). The dependent variable in columns (4)- (6) is the dividend price ratio of quota at the shery level.
The results suggest that uncontrolled harvest (from illegal harvest or due to harvest outside of New Zealand's national waters) have a signicant, negative impact on the dividend price ratio. Depending on the control variables included,R is between 0.8 and 1.1 percentage points higher for highly migratory species. A much stronger conclusion holds for stocks prone 21 New Zealand's sh production constitutes less than one percent of worldwide production, and exports (in terms of value) make up about two percent of overall international trade in sh products. Some stocks, however, are large on a worldwide basis. In these sheries the ex-vessel price is arguably endogenous. While we do not have a plausible instrument for ex-vessel prices, in alternative specications (available from the authors) we exclude these sheries. All of our results are robust to the exclusion of these sheries from the analysis. 22 In addition we have included sh categories used by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (ISSCAAP) categories in some specications to hold species group eects xed. In this specication we do not include ISSCAAP category xed eects because they are collinear with one of our key explanatory variables, the indicator for Highly Migratory Species.
to illegal harvest for which the dividend price ratio is roughly 3 percentage points higher than for other stocks. The impact on asset values is large and signicant for stocks facing illegal harvest, but the eect is less robust for migratory stocks. Interpreting these results in light of our analytical model suggests that the market behaves as if illegal harvest is increasing over time, while external pressure on highly migratory stocks may be closer to steady state.
In columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 , we estimate regression equations with the same controls as in column (1), but also including an indicator variable that equals one for all years including 1992 and thereafter as well as linear time trends for pre-and post-periods. As predicted by the theory, the asset value increases (column (3)) and the dividend price ratio decreases (column (6)) following dispute resolution. The point estimate suggests that postresolution there was a 3.9 percentage point decrease in the dividend price ratio, controlling for interest rates and shery-specic characteristics. Using Result 2 this result suggests that the market behaved (prior to dispute resolution) as if it expected at least 50% of the asset to be modied as a consequence of the two concurrent disputes.
5
Revocation Risk from Cross-Country Evidence
We now turn to cross-country evidence of the eects of revocation risk on asset values.
In practice, ITQ rights are rarely revoked. Yet as described above, the three countries in our analysis treat shery asset security in very dierent ways and thus there is substantial variation in the property rights underlying ITQs across countries. It may be possible to qualitatively describe each property right characteristic for each shery, but comparing these property rights characteristics across sheries and countries is dicult. Here we take a more agnostic approach, estimating reduced-form equations to test for systematic dierences in property rights across countries. Because most ITQ-harvested sh are traded in global markets, and similar species are harvested using similar shing technologies, it is reasonable to think that we can control for characteristics other than asset security that aect dividend price ratios. We attempt to carefully control for relevant shery-and country-specic characteristics. Once again we make use of the observation that by dividing lease price by sales price, the dividend price ratio washes away many shery and country specic factors that 
Log Lease Price The dependent variable is the ratio of the average lease price to the average sales price of quota in a management area. There are 992 observations in each regression. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Each specication also includes "type" xed eects, corresponding to oshore, inshore and shellsh (freshwater excluded), as well as the time trends for number of years (and years squared) since an individual shery has been managed by ITQs. Revenue volatility is calculated as the standard deviation in real total revenue for that shery over all years in our dataset.
aect the value of the shery. For example, highly-productive sheries or high-value species should have high annual values, and normalizing with the dividend price ratio allows us to isolate discounting behavior. Our model predicts that a higher probability of revocation will aect the dividend price ratio of quota by decreasing the asset value (Result 5). The main outcome variable of interest is the mean dividend price ratio of a shery in a given year.
Comparing across sheries, we can also use Result 6 to back out the implied dierence in revocation probability across countries.
Results from Cross-Country Analysis
As an introduction to the cross-country results, consider a graph of the median dividend price put under quota management in 1986, and the median dividend price ratio (R) 24 for that species group for the rst three years of the program (a period of extremely high interest rates) was about 17%, and over the entire series the medianR is about 8.8%. On the other hand, the Red Snapper shery in the Gulf of Mexico had a meanR of about 27%
during the rst two years of the ITQ program. Though biologically similar and traded in the same global market, the implicit revocation probability in the US shery is much higher, anecdotally supporting our hypothesis that weaker property rights raise the dividend price ratio. Of course, a host of factors could aect the dividend price ratio, which we consider below.
The dependent variable throughout this section is the dividend price ratio of ITQs. 25 We exploit the panel-structure of the data and estimate country xed-eects, which we use 24 We use the tilde notation to conform with our theoretical notation concerning the dividend price ratio when the asset in question may be revoked. 25 This variable was constructed using average annual sales and lease prices, which may introduce some measurement error into our dependent variable. Because our data are on an annual basis, we cannot take into account intra-year uctuations in lease or sales prices. Furthermore, because we are not constructing the ratio from individual transactions, we cannot observe whether any outliers (which may not represent arms-length transactions, for example) are included. To the extent that any measurement error is random (and uncorrelated with the independent variables), our estimates will be unbiased.
to test the null hypothesis that there is no systematic dierence in dividend price ratios across countries. We estimate several equations, including controls for market conditions, biological characteristics, xed eects for species groups, and year xed eects to control for time-varying unobservables.
The most basic specication regressesR on country xed eects, species group xed eects, 26 and the market interest rate (in this case that country's 5-year Treasury rate in that year). The results are in column (1) of Table 3 . Result 6 provides a concrete interpretation of these estimates. If we assume returns in each shery are roughly constant over time, so Y = 1, then for a discount factor of δ the dierence in revocation probability is simply
Using a discount factor of δ = 0.9, these results suggest that, on average, the revocation probability in the United States is about 6.3 percentage points larger than in New Zealand. The revocation probability in Canada is also signicantly larger than in New Zealand (1.7 percentage points), and the dierence between the United States and Canada is signicant. In the second specication (column 2), we add year xed eects to control for unobserved contemporaneous shocks. 27 In this case, the revocation probability in the United States is about nine points higher than in New Zealand. These results are economically signicant. The implied revocation probability is approximately as important as discounting itself.
Other factors, such as expectations about the future harvest and ex-vessel prices, would dictate future protability and hence quota sales prices. We attempt to control for these expectations by including trends for harvest and ex-vessel prices. Specically, we control for the percentage change of this year's harvest from last year (in that shery), and the percentage change of this year's average ex-vessel price from last year.
Although species group xed eects are included in every specication, we also add biological characteristics of each shery, which could inuence the horizon over which stocks rebuild. We control for years to maturity, length at maturity, and the maximum age of a species. Inclusion of these variables does not aect the main results, perhaps unsurprisingly because there is little variation in these variables within the species groupings used by the 26 We use ISSCAAP species group classications to hold constant species-specic eects; there are 18 groups in the baseline specication. 27 The results are robust to the inclusion of a quadratic function of interest rates.
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (ISSCAAP categories). Finally, the dynamics of a ratio within a shery over time suggest that the ratio of lease to sales prices decrease with the tenure of an ITQ program. For each shery, we include the number of years since the rst year of ITQ management. We also include a quadratic term to account for nonlinear relationships, and each of these variables is interacted with country xed eects to allow this eect to vary across countries. Column (3) of Table 3 includes these control variables and suggests the revocation probability in the United States is about 12 points larger than in New Zealand. In Canada, the point estimate indicates that the revocation probability is nearly eight points larger than in New Zealand.
As discussed above, New Zealand's Quota Management System includes many species not managed by ITQs in the United States or Canada. In column (4), we restrict the sample to include only New Zealand species with "comparable" counterparts in the United States or Canada. 28 These results are shown in column (4) of Table 3 . In this case, the point estimate rises still further so the implied revocation probability in the United States is 14 points higher than in New Zealand.
Our cross-country results suggest that the dividend price ratio of ITQs is signicantly higher in the United States and Canada, where property rights governing ITQs are relatively weak. Rather than picking up the desired eect of property rights security, these results could be reecting a higher risk of collapse in US and Canadian sheries. While we have no empirical or anecdotal evidence that this is the case (stock assessed ITQ sheries in all three countries tend to be in good health (Worm et al., 2009 ), we can test for it in our analysis. In columns (5) and (6) we include a dummy variable for stock collapse; our results are robust to the inclusion of this variable, as well as alternative denitions of collapse or measures of stock health. 29 In column (6), our preferred specication, the dividend price ratio in Canada is about seven points higher than in New Zealand, and that ratio in the United States is nearly 14 points higher than in New Zealand. These correspond to dierences in implied 28 Specically, we restrict the sample to include only species in ISSCAAP groups 25, 31, 32, 33 or 34. 29 Specically, we include an indicator variable equaling one if the stock is below ten percent of historical harvest levels, a common measure of shery "collapse" developed by ecologists (Worm et al. 2006 ). revocation probabilities of 8 and 16 percentage points, respectively.
The cross-country regression results suggest that ITQ sheries in the United States have a signicantly higherR than in Canada, which, in turn, is higher than New Zealand (though the results for Canada are not robust across specications). By Result 6, these suggest that ITQ shing asset markets have an implied probability of revocation that is perhaps of greater economic signicance than the discount rate itself. Because we are controlling for shery-specic characteristics and market factors, we argue that property rights strength explain the dierence in dividend price ratios across these countries. 30 6 Conclusion
This paper provides the rst theoretical and empirical exploration of how property right insecurity will aect marketable natural resource asset values. Our theoretical model provides general predictions about how various forms of property right insecurity (ownership disputes, illegal harvest, and revocation possibility) will aect lease prices, asset values, and dividend price ratios for natural resource assets.
Our initial empirical tests exploit important dierences in the exclusivity of sheries property rights within New Zealand. We nd that the resolution of two important ownership disputes led to a decrease in the dividend price ratio, as predicted by our model (Result 1).
Applying Result 2, our empirical nding suggests that the quota asset market behaved as if it expected a substantial (perhaps >50%) erosion of asset values. We also explored the eects of illegal and uncontrolled harvest and found evidence that sheries where the exclusivity is limited by illegal harvest have higher dividend price ratios, which suggests that illegal harvest may be growing over time. We nd only weak evidence that the negative consequences of migratory behavior are worsening. To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to use marketlevel natural resource prices to derive implied dynamic biological phenomena. 30 Our results are robust to a variety of additional controls, including revenue volatility and quadratic functions of the control variables. Furthermore, when estimating these regressions excluding the Red Snapper and Virginia Striped Bass sheries (both of which have very high dividend price ratios), the dierence between the United States and New Zealand remains signicant. The dependent variable is the ratio of the average lease price to the average sales price of quota in a management area. Each specication also includes, for each country, the number of years (and years squared) since an individual shery has been managed by ITQs. Collapsed equals 1 if that shery has current harvest levels less than ten percent of the historical maximum in our dataset. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-year, and ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Our cross-country evidence is based on the dramatically dierent legal denitions of ITQs as property in New Zealand, Canada and the United States. In our cross-country regressions, the point estimates suggest thatR for quota in the United States is nearly twice as large as in New Zealand. The averageR for quota in Canada is larger than in New Zealand in some specications, but these results are not as robust. These results are consistent with the general view that ITQs as property rights are more secure in New Zealand than in North
American sheries.
Several caveats should be mentioned. First, across countries, we have not quantied the eects of component characteristics of property rights on asset values. Instead, we rely on country xed-eects and dummy variables to capture dierences in property rights security across sheries. However, our focus on sheries and the use of the dividend price ratio allows us to isolate the eect of country-specic institutions on investment in common pool resources. Second, our cross-country results could be consistent with systematic dierences in the probability of shery collapse across countries. To attempt to rule out this possibility, we control for trends in harvest and ex-vessel prices in our main specications and we control for whether an individual shery was "collapsed" in any given year. Our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for the state of the sh stock as well as market conditions and trends, but, as in any cross-country regression, other unobserved heterogeneity may still be inuencing our results. Third, our cross-country results could be consistent with credit constraints and non-collateralizable assets. The dividend price ratio could be higher in the United States because of credit constraints and the inability to secure a loan for ITQ shares.
This would simply be a mechanism through which insecure property rights aect asset prices.
Finally, our results suggest that there is a pecuniary eect of property rights security, and if this result is present elsewhere (such as capital investment) the security of property rights are critical to sheries management. On the other hand, if the only impact of property rights security is through quota asset values then the impact on social welfare is unclear, though the security of property rights would clearly aect the distribution of wealth.
Property rights-based management of previously common-pool resources can lead to signicant economic gains by eliminating the tragedy of the commons and providing private incentives to steward the resource. Our theoretical results suggest that market-level prices can reveal important insights about: (1) the market's expectation about the outcome of ownership disputes, (2) whether illegal resource extraction will likely increase or decrease in the future, and (3) the implied probability of revocation for an insecure property right asset. Our empirical results suggest that stronger property rights lead to greater quota asset values. A closely related question concerns how property rights strength will aect dierent dimensions of investment in common pool resources (e.g. physical capital, environmental recovery, investment in self-enforcement, etc.). Indeed, these changes in investment may be partially responsible for the changes in asset values we observe. One implication may be that weak property rights decrease the incentive for good stewardship of the resource by increasing the average implicit discount rate. While we can only speculate on the underlying mechanisms, this research may help motivate future work on the eects of property rights security on the management, biological status, and sustainability of the resource itself. Table 2 . The dependent variable is the sales price of quota shares in New Zealand. Coecients on the instrumental variable, greenweight price, are shown for the three specications.
